Severability clauses and additional insureds

Do severability clauses protect additional insureds from policy exclusions? In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Burlington Ins. Co. Group, Inc., 2011 WL 1196894 (N.D. Ill.), the court said yes and no.

ADM was an AI on a contractor's policy with Burlington. An employee of the contractor injured at an ADM facility sued ADM. Burlington eventually rejected ADM's tender under the employer's liability and cross-liability exclusions. The employer's liability exclusion applied to "bodily injury to: (1) an 'employee' of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment of the insured;..." The cross-liability exclusion, on the other hand, applied to "'bodily injury' ...to...3. a present...employee of any insured." The policy also had a standard severability clause under which the insurance would apply "a. As if each named insured were the only named Insured; and b. Separately to each insured against whom...suit is brought."

The court, based upon the wording ("the" v. "any") and the underlying purpose of each exclusion, held that the employer's liability exclusion did not preclude coverage but that the cross-liability exclusion did.

Regarding the employer's liability exclusion, the court found that it could apply to the named insured only because it barred coverage for injury to an employee of "the insured." The cross-liability exclusion, however, did apply because it barred coverage for injury to an employee of "any insured."  In other words, if the underlying lawsuit involves an employee of any insured, no insured is covered. Further emphasizing this point, the court suggested that if the employer's liability exclusion had also referred to "any insured," there would be no coverage for any insured so long as one insured was the employer. The court stated that "[the] majority rule is that the distinction between the terms 'the insured' and 'any insured' in an exclusion is crucial in determining the import of a severability clause."

Is that so? Should it be? In reaching its holding the Midland court distinguished several cases where the courts refused, based upon the severability clause, to apply exclusions for "any insured' where the exclusion would not apply to the AI seeking coverage. For example, in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Shorenstein Realty Serv., 700 F.Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2010), the court refused to apply to AIs a professional services exclusion that barred coverage for injury caused by rendering or failing to render any professional services by or on behalf of "any insured" because the AIs did not perform professional services at the project. (Full disclosure: I represent one of the insureds in Shorenstein).

As the Midland court noted, the purpose of a cross-liability exclusion is to bar coverage for suits between insureds. The clause would be meaningless if it did not apply to all insureds. The purpose of the employer's liability and professional services exclusions, however, is narrower: It is to bar GL coverage where other insurance, workers compensation and professional liability, respectively, is available. These exclusions, then, should apply only to the named insured (where the  exclusion applies to "the insured") or to the insured who is the employer or is performing professional services (where the exclusion applies to "any insured"). Contrary to the Midland court's suggestion, the exclusions should not apply to all insureds where only one is implicated by the exclusion.

"Sole negligence" of named insured not bar to AI coverage

Pekin v. Hallmark Homes, L.L.C. raises what I call a Chandler v. Doherty problem. In other words, must the insured show a potential for coverage, or must the insurer affirmatively show that there is no potential for coverage?

In Chandler, Doherty had one vehicle insured with American Fire Ins. Co. (which I represented on appeal) and one vehicle uninsured, was involved in an accident in the uninsured vehicle which injured Chandler, whose complaint alleged only that Doherty was operating "a motor vehicle." The court held that there was a potential for coverage because"motor vehicle" did not affirmatively exclude the covered vehicle.

In Pekin Ins. Co. v. Beu, and Pekin Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the first district in effect took the oppisite view in interpreting the following additional insured endorsement in Pekin's policies:

Such person or organization is an additional insured only with respect to liability incurred solely as a result of some act or omission of the named insured and not for its own independent negligence or statutory violation.

The courts held that there would be no coverage for the AI where it is sued for its own negligence. In doing so they rejected the argument that the complaints raised the potential for vicarious liability to the AI, which would be covered under the endorsement, based on its control over the named insured.

However, in Hallmark the second district rejected those holdings, noting that the insurer owes a defense unless "'the insurance cannot possibly cover the liability arising from the facts alleged' and the terms of the policy clearly preclude coverage...."

The court found that the allegations of "control" against the AI could result in vicarious liability to the AI under section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Although it was interpreting the same endorsement, it found the holdings in Beu and UPS "unduly restrictive."

In short, with the Pekin endorsement, the insured need not show that the allegations trigger coverage; the insurer must show that they do not. In cases such as Hallmark, then, where the AI is the general contractor, vicarious liability will always be at least possible. In cases where vicarious liability is not possible, however, there will be no coverage. Given the Hallmark court's finding of coverage, the argument that the coverage is illusory fails.

The Hallmark court also considered the standard of review in declaratory actions, finding the case law on the issue confusing. The court held that where factual determinations are not at issue review is de novo.

Pekin had filed a motion for summary judgment where a motion for judgment on the pleadings would have been appropriate as only the allegations of the complaint and policy provisions were at issue. This appears to have been the source of Hallmark's argument that the standard of review should have been abuse of discretion.